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CAlmONE 'U. SUPERIOR COURT.

[18 C. C2d)

Oct. 1941.]

priate provisions of that section are made applicable to an
action brought under § 196a. And in an action brought in
behalf of an illegitimate child to enforce a parental obligation for support, the court is authorized to order the defendant to pay money necessary for support and prosecution of
the action pending its determination.
[4] Id. - Custody and Support-Filiation Proceedings-Support
of Child Pending Action-Nature and Effect of ProceedingAppeal.-Upon the hearing of an order to show cause why
the alleged father of a minor illegitimate child should not
pay support, court costs, and attorney's fees pending determination of the action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is her father
before he can be ordered to pay, and defendant must be
given an opportunity to be heal"d and to present his evidence.
And then,' even though the court issues the order, its implied
finding of paternity is not'l'es judicata nor determinative
of the issue of parentage at the trial. The resulting judgment is appealable independent of the final judgment in the
case.

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Pullen, J., pro tem:, concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 13, 1941.

[So F. No. 16546. In Bank.-Oct. 17, 1941.]

DIANE LEE CARBONE, a Minor, etc., Petitioner, V. SUPERIOR COURT OF NAPA COUNTY et aI., Respondents.
[1] Illegitimacy-Custody and Support-Filiation Proceedings-

"
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States Credit Bureau, said instrument is not subject to the
attack here made by appellants.
The judgment is affirmed.

..
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Support and .Attorney's Fees Pending .Action.-Under ·Civ.
Code, § 196a, as amended in 1939, which provides that a civil
suit .may be maintained in behalf of a minor illegitimate
child to enforce the obligation of a parent for support and
that in such an action the court shall have the power to
order and enforce performance thereof the same as under
§§ 137 .and . 137.5, the court in its discretion may order the'
payment of money necessary for the support of the illegitimate child and for the prosecution of the action pending its
determination.
[21 Id. - Custody and Support-Statutory Provision-Presumptions-Intent to Change Law.-Since Civ. Code, § 196a, as
amended in. 1939, which provides that in an action by an
illegitimate/child to enforce a parental obligation for support the: court has power to order and enforce performance
thereof the sa!p.e as under §§ 137, 137.5, is explicit in its
.t,e~, .a~d.. ,:i.ts purpose, to provide for an award pendente lite
'is .~pp~rentfrom' the previous interpretation of the statute
". ";:Which .d~D.ied " the right to counsel fees, costs and support
;pending 'the' 'final determination of an action, it is presumed
that the legislature in adopting the amendment had the prior
decisions in' mind and intended to change the law.
<irS] Id.~Custody: arid Support-Statutory Provision-Incorpora'tion of· Other Statutes by Reference.-By the reference in
Civ. Code, § 196a, as amended in 1939, to § 137 all approMcK. Dig. References: 1, 4. illegitimacy, § 20; 2, 3. Illegitirmacy, § 19.

~

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior
Court of Napa County, and Percy S. King, Judge thereof, to
grant a hearing on an order to show cause why defendant
should not pay support, court costs, and attorney's fees
pending termination of action. Writ granted.
Allen Spivock for Petitioner.
Rutherford, Rutherford & Rutherford for Respondents.
TRAYNOR,J.-Plaintiff, an illegitimate child, brought an
action through her mother, her guardian ad litem, against the
defendant for support and a judidal declaration of paternity.
The trial court issued an order directing defendant to show
cause why he should not pay support, court costs, and attorney's fees pending determination of the action. Upon defendant's objection that the court had no jurisdiction to
order him to make such payments until he was adjudged the
father of the child, the court refused to proceed with the
hearing or to take any evidence. Plaintiff thereupon petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the respond4. See 13 Cal. Jur. 937; 6 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 399; 7
Am. Jur. 695.
18 O. (2d)-25
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ent .court to grant a hearing on the order to show cause,
~ontending'that the 1939 amendment to section 196a of the
Civil·· C09,e' :gives the· ,court power to order the payme~t of
support, cosi~, and counsel fees pendente lite in an action
brought und~r 'that section.
[1] Section 196a provides: "The father as well as the
mother, of an illegitimate child must give him support and
education suitable to his circumstances. A civil suit to enforce such obligations may be maintained in behalf of a minor
illegitimate child, by his mother or guardian, or by a guardian ad Utem . . . and in such action the court shall have
power to order and enforce performance thereof, the same as
under sections 137, 137.5, 138, 139 and 140 of the Civil Code,
in a suit for divorce by a wife." The references to sections
137 and 137.5 in the last clause of the section were added in
1939.
Section 137 provides in part as follows: "When an action
for divorce is pending, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as
alimony any money necessary to enable the wife, or husband,
to support herself and her children, or to support himself
and his children, as the case may be, or to prosecute or defe~d the. action. "
Under the plain language of section 196a as ~mended the
court in an action to enforce the obligation of a father to
support an illegitimate child has the same power to order the
performance of that obligation as it has to order the performance of. a husband·'s obligation under section 137 in a
suit for divorce by a wife. Under section 137 the court,
when: an action for divorce is pending, may in its discretion
order the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary
to enable· the wife to support herself and her children or to
prosecute the action. Therefore it may likewise in its discretion order the payment of money necessary for the support of the illegitimate child and the prosecution of the
action pending its determination. (See 28 Cal. L. Rev. 442,
446.)
[2] . Not only is the amendment clear and explicit in its
terms, but its purpose to provide for an award pendente lite
.is apparent from the previous interpretation of section 196a.
Although it was held that the final judgment might include
'provision for attorney's fees (Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App.
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(2d) 122, [100 Pac. (2d) 806] ; Arias v. /(alensnikoff, 10 Cal .
(2d) 428 [74 Pac. (2d) 1043, 115 A. L. R. 163]) and support of the illegitimate child from the date of filing the
complaint (I(yne v. I(yne, supra; Mathews v. Hornbeck, 80
CaL App. 704 [252 Pac. 667]), the right to counsel fees,
costs, and SUpport pending the final determination of the
action was denied. (Schallman v. Haas, 33 Cal. App. 28
164 Pac. 336].) The legislature in adopting the amendment
presumably had these decisions in mind and intended to
change the law. (Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. (2d)
75 [113 Pac. (2d) 449]; Hoffman v. McNamara, 102 Cal.
App. 280 [282 Pac. 990] ; People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116 [255
Pac. 792, 52 A. L. R. 811] ; Pierce v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. (Zd)
513~ 520 [70 Pac. (2d) 206]. See Thomas v. Driscoll, 42 Cal.
App. (2·d) 23 [108 Pac. (2d) 43].)
[3] The contention that the reference to section 137 incorporates only the latter part of that section is untenable.
That part provides for enforcement of a final judgment in a
separate maintenance action by such orders as the court may
from time to time deem necessary. Not only did the court
have this power with respect to enforcement of the obligation to support the illegitimate child before the amendment to
section 19'6a. (see Civ. Code, sec. 138 and Sweet v. Ham'/,1othoris, 84 Cal. App. 775, 782 [258 Pac. 652J), but the reference to section 137 makes all the appropriate provisions of
that section applicable to an action brought under section
196a.

.,

1
1

I

Respondent contends that the defendant cannot be ordered
to support the plainti.ff until he is proved to be her father.
Th~ situation, however, is basically the same as in a divorce
action when the fact of marriage is denied. Proof of parentage is a jurisdictional ,prerequisite for an order to support an illegitimate child (Kyne v. Kyne, supra) jUst as the
existence ,of the marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for
the right of the court to order support, costs, and counsel
fees pendente lite in an action for divorce. (Hite v. Hite,
124 Cal. 389 [57 Pac. 227, 71 Am. St. Rep. 82, 45 L. R. A.
793]; In re Cook, 42 Cal. App. (2'd) 1 [108 Pac. (2d) 46] .
See Lorraine v. Lorraine, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 687, 697 [48 Pac.
. (2d) 48] .)Even though the defendant in an action for eli-

>I:

.... --"'~ .1

-

772

CARBONE V. SUPERIOR COURT.

[18 C. (2d)

Oct. 194I.J
vorce denies the existence of the marriage, the court may
nevertheless make the order if defendant is given an opportunity to be heard and the marriage is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Hite v. Hite, supra; Bancroft
V. Bancroft, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 464 [50 Pac. (2d) 465].) The
application is determined upon a record of its own and results in an appealable judgment independent of the final
judgment in the action. (Robbins v. Mulcrevy, 101 CaL App.
3'00 [281 Pac. 668].) Although such an order implies a finding of the existence of the relationship, the proceeding need
not. be so complete nor the evidence so extensive as upon the
trial of the issues of the case and the order therefore does not
determine those issues, nor affect the final judgment. (Sharon
~~ Sha:ron, 75 Cal. 1 [16 Pac. 345] ; Hite v. Hite, supra.),
[4] Since the decisions interpreting section 137 are directly applica1>le to actions under 196a, the plaintiff, upon the
hearing of· the 'order to show cause, must prove by a preponderance . q£ the, evidence that the defendant is her father
before he can be ordered to pay her support, costs of suit,
or counsel fee~ pending the trial of the issues of the case~
The. defendant must, be given an opportunity to be heard and
Ito pI-,esent his evidence, Then, even though the court upon
:a preponderarice of the evidence presented at the hearing
issues the. order, its implied finding of paternity is not res
judicata nor determinative of the issue of parentage at the
trial. . The proceeding is merely a hearing upon an order to
show cause for the purpose of determining plaintiff's right to
an award pendente lite, and while defendant may put the
'jurisdictional/prerequisite of parentage in issue, the evidence
produced"by the parties need not be so extensive as at the
trial 'of the action. The resulting judgment is temporary in
effect; except as to payments already accrued thereunder,' its
operation terminates upon the final determination of the
action or' upon order of the court. It is appealable inde,pendently of the final judgment in the case. The rights of
an alleged father in an action under section 196a thus receive
'the same protection as those of an alleged husband under
'section 137.
In the instant case the trial court erroneously refused to
permit plaintiff to introduce any evidence of paternity. Both
plaintiff and defendant should have been heard on the order to
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show cause and a decision made a. to the allowance of SUpport,
attorney's fees, and costs pending the trial of the action.
Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, O. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., and
Carterl J., concurred.

[So F. No. 16590. In Bank.-Oct. 17, 1941.J

JAMES P. HICKS, Respondent, v. OOEAN SHORE RAIL.
ROAD, INC. (a Corporation), et aI., Appellants.
[1] Appeal-B.eview-1nsuJlic;ency of Evidence-consideration of
Evidence._It is not the duty of an appellate court to evaluate the evidence for the purpose of mak,ing new findings
but merely to ascertain Whether there is substantial evidence
in SUpport of the judgment.
~

(2] Id.-Review-InsuJliciency of Evidenc&--'1'o Support Verdict
-Verdict on Evidence Inherently Improbable-Asserted PerjurY.-The reversal of a judgment upon the ground of asserted perjury cannot be ordered except Where the testimony
is such as to shock the moral sense of the Court. The testimony must be incredible. Where such testimony is not inherently improbable it is the exclusive province of the jury
to determine the truth of the matter in issue.
(3] Id.-InsuJliciency of Evidence-'1'o Support Verdict--Verdjct
on Evidence Inherently Improbable-Asserted PerjurY-Ques_
tion for JurY.-The confiicting statements of a plaintiff made
to a witness about one hour after an accident that h~s injury
was sustained While he was endeavoring to adjust the carburetor of the power shovel's motor did not support a claim
of perjury in his testimony that the accident was caused by
the employer's negligence in failing to furnish adequate
protection to workmen engaged in removing rock and earth
at a place where slides Were imminent and that the accident

MCK. Dig. References: 1. Appeal and Error, § 1242; 2-4. Appeal and Error, § 1267; 5. Evidence, § 156 (7); 6. Workmen's
Compensation, § 18; 7. Trial, § 139 (3); 8. Damages, § 101; 9.
Damages, § 89; 10. Damages, § 197; n, 14. Workmen'. Compen.
sation, § 16; 12. Evidence, § 461; 13. Evidence, § 307; 15. Appeal and Error, § 195; 16. Workmen's Compensation, § 14; 17.
New Trial, § 82; 18. New Trial, § 12; 19. New Trial, § 163.

